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Book Reviews
The following book reviews have been provided by Ken Madden. Sanders, James. The Downing of TWA Flight 800. More on Schiavo at: Kieth Hill commentary on Schiavo. Sanders, James. The Downing of TWA Flight 800. New York: Zebra Books, 1997. $6.99. 240pp. Sanders' book presents one cogent and logical explanation for the TWA Flight 800 explosion off Long Island, New York on July 17, 1996. To date, none of the three theories, a bomb, a missile, or a mechanical malfunction, have been eliminated from NTSB consideration. Evidence needs to be found to support any of these theories and no hard evidence has been found so far, only an abundance of speculation. Sanders presents evidence of solid rocket fuel being deposited on seats only in a specific section of the cabin. If the substance was glue (as the Feds have called it), it would have been present in the seats throughout the cabin of the B-747. Also, clear evidence (holes) made by an object entering and exiting the fuselage was found. This area coincides with the mysterious "glue" found on the seats (but see below). Still, there were some inconsistencies in The Downing of TWA Flight 800. First, when looking at the wreckage distribution diagrams, the winds aloft from 15,000 feet to the surface should have been analyzed. The lighter debris would have been most affected by the winds and may have drifted horizontally somewhat before hitting the ocean. Also, more dredging of the ocean floor needs to be done in the debris field closest to JFK in order to determine the initial event that precipitated the explosion and break-up. Second, a drawing depicts the missile going through the cargo hold just under R2 (door); if it went through the cargo hold, and unless the floor collapsed due to decompression, why were the cabin seats above this area deposited with rocket fuel? Third, and the point is probably moot, is Sanders' explanation for the wing fuel tank explosions. He states the aircraft turned on its side and since flames tend to rise, set the upward-pointing wing on fire. My explanation is as follows: The aircraft was trimmed for climb airspeed via the horizontal stabilizer position, which also keeps the nose up by downward-acting aerodynamic pressure. When the forward fuselage separated, two things happened: 1) the dynamic pressure due to the airflow at 300+ knots acting on the open-ended fuselage would have been tremendous and 2) when the weight of the forward fuselage was removed, the rest of the airplane would have pitched up instantly to seek the previously-set trimmed airspeed. This would have over-stressed the wings due to excessive positive load factor (g) and the wings failed, spilling, misting, and igniting the fuel in them. Only then did the second and most massive explosion occur. For the missile theorists, Sanders' book is an intriguing read and is highly recommended.
White, Catherine B. TWA Flight 800: The Mystery Solved. San Marcos, CA: ShiningStar Publications, 1997. 14 pp. $9.95. This brief book resembles more a "sales brochure" than a book. Only pages 11 and 12 discuss the authors' theory that "oxygen in the tank" caused the explosion. The others supply explanation of the workings and schematic diagrams of the 747's fuel system. She seems to think that the fuel vents are manually opened and closed by the fuelers and/or maintenance personnel on the ground (p 12). "But if someone forgot to re-open the vents, then air would have been trapped in the tank" (p 12). "Air trapped in the tank" caused the the explosion? How does the author think fuel is supplied to the engines? If the tanks aren't vented to the atmosphere, there wouldn't be anything to replace the fuel in the tank as it is consumed and one of two things would happen: 1) Fuel starvation would occur, or 2) The tank would collapse progressively as fuel is consumed. Either scenario is not normal. Venting also reduces fuel vapors in the tank by siphoning. When others discuss overheated fuel tanks and vapors as contributing to the center tank explosion, they miss the fact that as the aircraft climbed to 12,700 feet, the atmospheric pressure reduction in the tank would have caused a substantial decrease in the fuel vapor's temperature. On page 13, she recommends the airlines "install oxygen detectors in the top of all fuel tanks . . ., connected to cockpit indicators" and to "keep a minimum of 2,000 gallons [13,400 lbs.] of fuel in all center main fuel tanks." Notwithstanding that tinkering this extra fuel around would contribute to substantially higher aircraft operating costs, the reason for favoring the wing tanks at lighter gross weight conditions is "wing bending relief." By placing more fuel (and weight) in the wing tanks, the stresses of flight are distributed more evenly over the wing's span rather than concentrated at the wing roots. TWA Flight 800: The Mystery Solved is overpriced, lacking in theoretical soundness, and not recommended. Schiavo, Mary, with Sabra Chartrand. Flying Blind, Flying Safe. New York: Avon Books, 1997. 373pp. $25.00. Schiavo's book, although meant to be a blockbuster, was obviously completed in a rush after she resigned her position as Inspector General in charge of overseeing the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). It could have been a much better book if the timing wasn't so critical. Numerous factual errors and some amateurish prose (even with a second author) make the book quite a bit less than it could have been. Although the book contains references, there is no index (a large omission in any work of non-fiction). First, it must be realized that the FAA has many good and conscientious employees who try to do the job of overseeing our nation's air carrier industry with too few resources. The FAA's organizational structure is just too bureaucratic for many of its employees to think they can make a tangible difference individually. Second, the dual mandate that the FAA both promote and oversee the aviation industry might be too dichotomous in nature for both mandates to be served effectively. Third, Schiavo paints a picture that airlines are constantly attempting to cut corners in safety matters if they weren't restrained from doing so by the Far (Federal Aviation Regulations) and the FAA. Contrary to this belief, most carriers would continue to insist on a safe operation even if the FAA did not exist. When the statistics are perused, most of the air carriers in the world are safe, many outstandingly so. An air carrier's very existence, economically-speaking, demands a reasonably safe operation be maintained. Schiavo does, however, make some very good points in areas that need improving. But like many issues in today's society, and specifically concerning the dichotomy of airline safety, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle of a continuum (the opposite ends of which might be marked "Unsafe" and "Safe"), with the safety of individual carriers, aircraft, and airports occupying different locations on the continuum. The following excerpts illustrate some of the technical foibles that can be found throughout the book: . . . "if no one was hurt or killed, then its just an incident, not an accident." (p. 66) Schiavo needs to review the definitions of "incident" and "accident." Refers to a sextant as a "sexton." (p. 160) "In tests, wings are flexed as much as 150 degrees from their normal position." (p. 214) Figure this one out. Referring to Lockheed's L-1011, "With the DC-10, their past troubles made a lot of people wary of flying them." (p. 229) The L-1011 is one of the safest and systems-redundant aircraft in the air; this author knows of no previous or current inherent problems with the L-1011 that would make passengers "wary" of flying on them. Referring to aging aircraft, "It can't be mere coincidence that TWA is getting rid of its fleet of old 747s and replacing them with newer 767s and 757's." (p. 231) TWA is replacing its 747s for purely economic reasons, with its high fuel and crew costs. An airplane may be used safely as long as the carrier deems necessary as long as it is properly maintained. Again referring to the L-1011, "The plane has only six exits as opposed to eight in most planes." (p.234) The L-1011 has eight exits. Definition of "cross-check." (p.241) Huh? Definition of "pilot deviations." (p. 249) Includes inadvertent altitude, heading, or course deviations, usually due to misunderstanding with ATC (Air Traffic Control) or complacency. Referring to wind shear, "It is also a mystery--no one really understands how it affects plane performance." (p. 288) Wind shear has been actively studied since the 1975 Eastern B-727-225 accident at JFK (which the author mistakenly refers to as an L-1011 on page 265). Although there are many more errors in the book, the foregoing is a sample. For most passengers, the most useful and accurate chapters in the book are: Chapter 15 "Straighten Up and Fly Right, and Chapter 16 "Flying Healthy." Arguably, the most unusual and entertaining chapter is Chapter 7 "Relative Truth: CULT-ure at the FAA," which describes some of the bizarre practices employed at FAA management seminars conducted by Gregory May. Flying Blind, Flying Safe is a decent read if one realizes the point of view portrayed by the author is an extreme one. Still, for its impact, Flying Blind, Flying Safe has to be almost on par with Rodney Stich's The Real Unfriendly Skies: Saga of Corruption (3rd ed., Reno, NV: Diablo Western Press, 1990, 656 pp.) For additional information about the glaring deficiencies in the Schiavo book, see the comments by Keith Hill, Chief Engineer for embedded software on the 777 airplane, at Boeing. Kieth Hill commentary on Schiavo.
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